Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of State Law by Heald, Paul
Unfair Competition and Federal Law:
Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of
State Law
Paul Healdt
Plaintiffs who bring federal claims for trademark infringement
under the Lanham Trademark Act1 often assert pendent claims al-
leging violation of state unfair competition law. When courts deter-
mine that Lanham Act violations have occurred, they often issue
injunctions that place nationwide limitations on the infringer's
right to market its products.2 But even when a Lanham Act claim
fails, courts nevertheless often issue similar multistate injunctions
based on the pendent state law claims.3 These injunctions, in ef-
fect, subject national unfair competition suits to regulation by the
laws of a single state.
This comment argues that courts should decide interstate un-
fair competition claims solely under federal law. More particularly,
the comment argues that the multistate injunctions issued by
courts on the basis of state law claims violate the commerce, due
process, and full faith and credit clauses of the United States Con-
stitution. While it may be theoretically possible to remedy the con-
stitutional defects in these state law injunctions by crafting the in-
junctions more carefully, this remedy would be difficult to
implement in practice. The great problems inherent in drafting
constitutionally sound multistate injunctions based on state unfair
competition law provide good reason for courts to consider seri-
ously the possibility that the Lanham Act preempts state regula-
tion of unfair competition. Exclusive application of federal law in
this context would avoid the constitutional concerns that arise
when courts issue multistate injunctions pursuant to a single
t A.B., 1980, University of Illinois; A.M., 1982; J.D. candidate, The University of Chi-
cago, 1988.
' The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982) provides for the federal
registration of trademarks. Its purpose is to protect the integrity of a trademark owner's
product identity and to prevent confusion and deception of consumers. See, e.g., T & T Mfg.
Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 537-38 and n.2 (1st Cir. 1978).
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116 (Supp. III 1985).
3 See cases cited in notes 9-11.
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state's law. This comment concludes that federal law does indeed
preempt state law in the field of unfair competition.
Part I of this comment explores the current situation, which
finds some federal courts, particularly in the Second Circuit, issu-
ing nationwide injunctions after deciding multistate unfair compe-
tition actions under the anomalous law of a single state. Part II
explains how this practice can offend the commerce, due process,
and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution. Part III dem-
onstrates that using ordinary remedies to address these concerns is
impractical in multistate unfair competition actions. Part IV ar-
gues that courts should find that the Lanham Act preempts state
unfair competition law.
I. MULTISTATE INJUNCTIONS UNDER STATE LAW
Federal courts' issuance of multistate injunctions pursuant to
the unfair competition laws of a single state has had two results.
First, it has created disuniformity among the federal circuits: a
Second Circuit court sitting in New York, for example, will fre-
quently apply New York unfair competition law which differs from
the California law that a Ninth Circuit court sitting in California
would apply to the same case.4 Second, federal courts' issuance of
multistate injunctions pursuant to the unfair competition laws of a
single state has allowed the federal courts to extend the anomalous
laws of New York and some other states to transactions utterly
unrelated to those states.
This section provides three examples of areas where federal
courts hearing pendent state law unfair competition claims have
The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have recognized the problem of whether to
apply federal common law or state law in these cases, but they have so far avoided making
explicit determinations. Instead, these courts have applied "general principles" that for all
practical purposes amount to federal law. The Ninth and Second Circuits, however, always
apply state law to pendent unfair competition claims. For examples of the positions of the
various circuits, see Keebler Co. v. Robira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 371-72 (1st Cir. 1980)
(applying both federal and state common law under the assumption that application of ei-
ther would engender the same result); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d
774, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1964); Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute America, Inc., 779 F.2d 799,
801-02 and n.1 (2d Cir. 1985); Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, 628 F.2d
387, 394 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (followed a previous federal decision which had inferred Colo-
rado law from federal principles and then looked to Texas law only to determine if the
court's holding would be repugnant to any concepts in substantive Texas trademark law);
W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusal to determine
whether federal or state common law applied because parties did not argue the question);
Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981).
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issued multistate injunctions pursuant to the anomalous unfair
competition laws of individual states.
A. Anti-Dilution Statutes
Both the Lanham Act 5 and state common law6 require some
element of customer confusion as to the source of a product before
a claim of unfair competition can succeed. However, at least
twenty states have anti-dilution statutes that prevent the "dilut-
ing" of a distinctive trademark's uniqueness even in the absence of
customer confusion, by prohibiting its use on non-competing prod-
ucts.7 Under the dilution rationale, the owner of a distinctive mark
such as "Hyatt" for hotels could prevent a law firm from using
"Hyatt" as a trademark for its legal services, although there is lit-
tle danger of confusion."
The recent cases of L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub., Inc.9 and
Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services'° illustrate how courts some-
times use state anti-dilution statutes to enjoin nationwide commer-
cial activity." In L.L. Bean, the plaintiff, a mail order catalog re-
tailer, brought a trademark infringement action against the
publisher of a national erotic magazine that had inserted a supple-
ment called the "L.L. Beam Sex Catalog" in one of its issues. Be-
cause the plaintiff could not show a sufficient likelihood of confu-
5 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982). See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d
651, 658 (2d Cir. 1979).
6 See Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1296-97
(9th Cir. 1971).
As of 1982, they were: Ala.Code § 8-12-17 (Supp. 1982); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 70-550
(1979); Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 14330 (West Supp. 1980); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 35-11i(c)
(West 1981); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1980); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 495.151 (West 1979);
Official Code of Ga.Ann. § 10-1-451 (Michie 1982); Idaho Code § 48-512 (1977); Ill.Ann.Stat.
ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Iowa Code Ann. § 548.11(2) (West Supp. 1982);
Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 10, § 1530 (1980); Mass.Ann.Laws ch. l0B, § 12 (Michie/Law Coop. 1975);
Mo.Ann.Stat. § 417.061 (Vernon 1979); Mont.Code Ann. § 30-13-334 (1981); Neb.Rev.Stat. §
87-122 (1981); N.M.Stat.Ann. § 57-3-10 (1981); N.Y.Gen.Bus.Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968);
Or.Rev.Stat. § 647.107 (1981); R.I.Gen.Laws § 6-2-12 (Supp. 1981); Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-25-
512 (Supp. 1982).
8 See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1984), on
remand, 618 F.Supp. 381 (N.D.Ill. 1985).
' 625 F.Supp. 1531 (D.Me. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
10 736 F.2d 1153.
" For other examples, see Polaroid Corporation v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1963) (injunction granted on state claims); Arthur Young, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 579
F.Supp. 384 (N.D.Ala. 1983) (plaintiffs entitled to relief under federal and Alabama laws);
Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Cinnabar 2000 Haircutters, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F.Supp. 323, 340 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (explicitly
enjoining defendants' actions outside Illinois based on violation of Illinois law), aff'd 694
F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124
(N.D.Ga. 1981).
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sion between the two publications, the court refused to grant
summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim and a pendent claim
under the Maine Deceptive Trade Practices Act.12 The court held,
however, that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment and
nationwide injunctive relief under the Maine Anti-Dilution
statute."3
In Hyatt, the Hyatt Corporation hotel chain had brought a
similar action against Hyatt Legal Services in federal district court
in Illinois. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring
Hyatt Legal Services, co-founded by Joel Hyatt, from using the
name "Hyatt" without also including the name "Joel." As in L.L.
Bean, because there was insufficient likelihood of confusion, only
the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act claim succeeded.14 Even though Hy-
att Legal Services' use of name "Hyatt" was perfectly permissible
under federal law, and under the laws of a majority of the states,
the Seventh Circuit directed the district court to enter a nation-
wide injunction. 5
Application of such injunctions in jurisdictions that have cho-
sen not to enact anti-dilution statutes is especially disturbing, be-
cause anti-dilution statutes undo the traditional common law right
of a business to use any name that is not libelous, deceptive, or
likely to confuse.' 6 Defendants such as Drake Publishing and Hy-
att Legal Services find themselves bound nationwide by the anom-
alous law of a single state.
B. New York Trademark Law
The Second Circuit frequently issues injunctions pursuant to
New York's anomalous unfair competition law. When determining
which state law to apply to interstate unfair competition claims
brought in New York, the Second Circuit in theory applies New
York's conflict of laws rules.' In practice, however, the court
selects New York law without any explicit conflicts analysis or con-
sideration of the facts of the case." New York's unfair competition
12 L.L. Bean, 625 F.Supp. at 1534-35, 1536.
13 Id. at 1536-39.
14 Hyatt, 736 F.2d at 1157-58.
15 Id. at 1160.
11 The idea of dilution is a relatively recent development in this country. It was intro-
duced into this country from German law by Frank Schecter. See Frank I. Schecter, The
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 831-33 (1927).
" Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corporation, 335 F.2d 774, 780-81 and n.3 (2d
Cir. 1964).
18 Id; Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute America, Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 802 n.1 (2d Cir.
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law is much broader than federal unfair competition law or other
state unfair competition laws because of the "New York Rule"' 9
which holds that plaintiffs need not prove secondary meaning-the
actual identification in consumers' minds of a trademark with a
single producerQ -in order to obtain protection for that
trademark.
When the Second Circuit applies the New York rule to multi-
state unfair competition claims, it extends nationwide protection
under a standard different from federal law and the law of most, if
not all, states. For example, in order to win a claim for trade dress
infringement under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove that its
product's trade dress, the packaging of a product aside from the
actual trade name, has acquired secondary meaning.2' Secondary
meaning is difficult to prove, especially in trade dress cases;22 by
eliminating this burden, the New York rule makes unfair competi-
tion claims much more likely to succeed. Thus, plaintiffs seeking
nationwide relief who bring suit on both state and federal claims in
a New York district court may succeed where in other jurisdictions
they might not.
Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute America, Inc.23 illustrates
the broad scope of protection provided by the Second Circuit
under New York law. Design Institute America (DIA) claimed that
Morex had copied its product, a shelf system for closets.2 ' The Sec-
1985); Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
11 For a good, although now slightly dated, discussion of the New York Rule, see J.
Thomas McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 15:4-5 (2d ed. 1984).
20 Under the Lanham Act, secondary meaning is not necessary to protect fanciful, arbi-
trary, or coined marks: e.g., Exxon, Kodak, Screaming Yellow Zonkers. However, public
identification of a mark or trade dress with a specific product source is necessary to protect
descriptive marks: e.g., Pizza World, or a handbag design.
21 See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc., v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857 (11th
Cir. 1983).
2 To prove that trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, a plaintiff must show
that absent any label indicating the product name, consumers recognize the product as com-
ing from a single source. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir.
1985). Obviously, it is easier to prove that the shape of a Rolls Royce hood ornament has
secondary meaning than to prove that a brand of toothpicks has a secondary meaning, un-
less they are distinctly shaped and, therefore, very well known.
22 779 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1985), on remand, No. 84 Civ. 607, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 8,
1986).
24 In trademark law, "copying" need not have any negative connotations. In the ab-
sence of a patent, businesses are free to copy competitors' products and a state may only
intervene to prevent consumers from being misled as to the source. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). Similarly, federal trademark law only prohibits the
copying of those non-functional aspects of a product which have acquired secondary mean-
ing. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and
Unfair Competition at § 6:3 (cited in note 19).
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ond Circuit found no Lanham Act violation because it concluded
that DIA had failed to prove that DIA's design had acquired sec-
ondary meaning. Nevertheless, the court went on to note that New
York state law does not require secondary meaning, and thus re-
manded for further consideration of a potential state law unfair
competition claim. On remand, the determination of infringement
under state law followed easily.25 As a remedy, the court issued a
multistate injunction. This protection from copying in the absence
of proof of secondary meaning was based solely on New York law,
yet the protection afforded DIA, like other successful Second Cir-
cuit litigants, was nationwide.26
C. Mold Statutes
Similar problems may arise in connection with claims brought
under "mold statutes. '27 These recently enacted statutes prohibit
the sale of products reproduced by "any direct molding process in
which the original manufactured item was itself used as a plug for
the making of the mold which is used to manufacture the duplicate
item. '28 These statutes afford protection beyond that provided by
patent law, trademark laws, or the common law of unfair competi-
tion.29 It is, for example, a well-established rule at common law
that manufacturers may obtain, examine, and reproduce unpat-
ented products, a process commonly known as reverse
engineering.30
To date, only one federal court has issued a nationwide injunc-
tion based partially on the violation of these mold statutes. In
Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc.,3 1 a New York district
25 Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute America, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 607 (CMM), slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1986) (available on WESTLAW).
26 See also Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613
F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd 800 F.2d 256 (Fed.Cir. 1986).
'" Mold statutes are a new form of economic protectionism. Current states with such
statutes include California, Michigan, and Tennessee. See Annot.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code §§
17300-17301 (West 1987); Mich.Comp.Laws Annot. §§ 445.621-624 (West Supp. 1987);
Tenn.Code Annot. § 47-50-111 (1984).
28 Annot.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17300(c) (West 1987).
29 The statutes are not preempted by patent law, however, apparently because they
merely eliminate one cheap method of copying and do not ban other types of copying. See
Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684-85 (Fed.Cir. 1985).
30 See, e.g., John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp. 419 F.Supp. 292, 313, 316 (E.D.Pa. 1976),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3rd Cir. 1978).
The idea that molding can be proscribed is a recent response to competition from the Far
East.
11 618 F. Supp. 273, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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court issued an injunction prohibiting the defendant from import-
ing its product into the United States. It did so on the grounds
that the defendant's product violated New York unfair competi-
tion law and the California, Michigan, and Tennessee mold stat-
utes. Consequently, the plaintiff received nationwide protection
due to the anomalous laws of a few states.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS OF MULTISTATE INJUNCTIONS
Most courts issuing nationwide injunctions pursuant to pen-
dent state law unfair competition claims do so without explaining
why the injunction, based entirely on state law, should extend be-
yond the borders of the state providing the law of decision.3 2 In a
few cases, however, courts have provided explanations for issuing
multistate injunctions after finding a violation of an individual
state's unfair competition law. These explanations take either of
two forms. Courts may justify multistate injunctions based on ex-
plicit and implicit authorization from state unfair competition
law.3 3 Alternatively, courts may apply an individual state's unfair
competition law beyond the boundaries of that state on the argu-
ment that the state's conflict of laws principles authorize applica-
tion of the state unfair competition law to the entire dispute.3 4
The two possible justifications for the injunctions, as well as
the particular constitutional problems related to each justification,
may be illustrated by a paradigm case that embodies the salient
features of the application of anti-dilution statutes, mold statutes,
and New York common law of unfair competition. Although this
paradigm case involves a statutory regulation, it need not; identical
problems would arise if anomalous state common law were in-
volved. California has a law forbidding the common business prac-
tice of using "loss leaders," goods priced below cost in an effort to
attract customers.3 5 In most states, this practice is perfectly legal.
Suppose that a national department store chain begins a nation-
wide campaign to attract customers to its stores by selling a hug-
gable teddy bear at well below its wholesale cost. It conducts this
promotion in every state. Another retailer, which sells a similiar
bear, brings suit in a federal court in California for trademark in-
fringement under the Lanham Act. In addition, the retailer presses
11 See, e.g., Morex, S.P.A., 779 F.2d 799; Hyatt, 736 F.2d 1153; Polaroid, 319 F.2d 830.
33 See Hyatt, 610 F.Supp. 381, 385-6 (court issued injunction but stayed as to advertise-
ments not expected to reach Illinois).
3' See, e.g., Instrumentalist, 509 F.Supp. at 340.
35 See Annot.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17044 (West 1987).
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a state claim for loss-leading under the California statute. Neither
retailer is a California resident. The court finds the bears dissimi-
lar and therefore denies relief under the Lanham Act, but, pursu-
ant to the California loss-leading statute, the court enjoins the first
retailer from selling its teddy bears anywhere in the country.
The California federal court might support its broad injunc-
tion by either of two different lines of reasoning. First, the court
might regard multistate injunctions as essential to the substantive
purposes of the California law. The judges might reach this conclu-
sion by interpreting the law either to aim directly at regulation of
out-of-state competition as well as in-state competition, or to cre-
ate a right within California that is susceptible of protection only
by a nationwide injunction. For example, the judges might inter-
pret the California law as seeking to ensure vigorous competition
within the state of California. The judges might then construe the
law to require a multistate injunction on the ground that a corpo-
ration which is unable to compete effectively outside California
will be hindered in its efforts to compete effectively inside Califor-
nia. Regardless of whether the substantive California state law
right at stake is statutory or common law in character, if the state
law expressly or by construction requires regulation of commerce
outside the state, evident commerce clause problems arise.
On the other hand, the California federal court might regard
our paradigm case as presenting an array of related disputes cen-
tered in different states, or a single dispute not centered in Califor-
nia or any other single state. The laws of several states might ap-
pear relevant to all or part of the law suit. The federal court's
decision to issue a nationwide injunction based on California law
would then depend upon a conflict of laws analysis holding that
California law governs the entire law suit. If the nationwide injunc-
tion rests on such an argument, the analysis might violate the con-
stitutional restrictions on conflict of laws rules imposed by the due
process and full faith and credit clauses.
The two different lines of justification for the multistate in-
junction are thus distinguishable in three respects: (1) the first jus-
tification depends on a broad construction of the underlying sub-
stantive rule, while the second depends on the construction of
conflict of laws rules; (2) the first justification raises the question
of whether any state (rather than the federal government) may
regulate unfair competition in the way California has attempted to
do, while the second justification raises the question of whether the
law of some other state is a more appropriate rule of decision; and
(3) the first justification therefore raises potential commerce clause
1418 [54:1411
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problems, while the second raises potential due process and full
faith and credit clause problems. Of course, it would be a mistake
to regard the two lines of justification as entirely distinct. For ex-
ample, a broad construction of the purposes of the underlying Cali-
fornia substantive law might skew a conflict of laws interest analy-
sis in favor of the application of the California law.
Only two cases have discussed the constitutional problems
arising from multistate injunctions predicated upon either of the
two justifications just discussed. In Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine
Corps League6 the defendants claimed that under conventional
principles of conflict of laws, the court could enjoin their activity
only in Illinois. In rejecting the possibility of any constitutional de-
fect in the scope of the injunction, Judge Shadur stated:
Instrumentalist has asserted a protectable Illinois property
right and now seeks to enjoin conduct in Illinois and else-
where affecting its value. It would be the height of absurdity
to hold that Illinois had a legitimate interest in protecting
vested rights . . . against dilution but that, having acquired
jurisdiction over an offender, courts sitting in Illinois would be
helpless to deal with dilutive acts once they crossed state
37
Judge Shadur's argument simply ignores the commerce clause re-
strictions on Illinois' power to create rights that depend upon the
regulation of commerce outside Illinois.
Judge Moran called attention to this problem in Hyatt Corp v.
Hyatt Legal Services3' where he criticized Judge Shadur's reason-
ing in Instrumentalist. According to Judge Moran, while courts
certainly have the power to issue such injunctions by virtue of
their jurisdiction over the parties, that fact does not resolve the
issue of whether the exercise of such power has constitutional
ramifications. After lengthy analysis, Judge Moran concluded that
there was a strong possibility of a constitutional infirmity in the
nationwide injunction. 9 The remainder of this section argues that
neither the substantive law justification nor the conflict of laws
30 509 F.Supp. 323 (N.D.Ill. 1983).
37 Id. at 340.
38 610 F.Supp. 381, 382-3 (N.D.Ill. 1985).
11 Id. at 385. Judge Moran, however, was compelled by the Seventh Circuit's instruc-
tions on remand to enter a nationwide injunction anyway. Judge Moran also felt bound by
the many prior Illinois precedents that had allowed issuance of a nationwide injunction in
similar cases although the Illinois anti-dilution statute did not specify the scope of the in-
junction. Id. at 385-86.
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justification provides courts with a constitutional basis for the issu-
ance of multistate injunctions. Subsection A demonstrates that the
commerce clause limits a court's ability to apply an individual
state's unfair competition law beyond the state's boundaries. Sub-
section B shows that when under a conflict of laws analysis, courts
must recognize that the due process and full faith and credit
clauses limit the court's ability to apply the unfair competition law
of an individual state beyond that state's boundaries.
A. Commerce Clause Concerns
Courts have long recognized that the commerce clause 40 places
implicit limits on the powers of the states to regulate interstate
commerce. 4' There are two basic principles of commerce clause ju-
risprudence: (1) that states cannot directly regulate interstate com-
merce; and (2) that incidental regulations of interstate commerce
cannot be excessive in light of local interests.42
Two recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that an extra-
territorial application of state unfair competition law, like that de-
scribed in our paradigm case, would be unconstitutional under this
two-pronged commerce clause analysis. In Brown-Foreman Distill-
ers v. N.Y. Liquor Authority,43 the Supreme Court used the first of
the two principles-that no state statute may directly regulate in-
terstate commerce-to strike down a New York law. The law in
question required distillers doing business in the state to sell liquor
to New York wholesalers at a price no higher than the lowest price
given to wholesalers in other states. In effect, the law prevented a
distiller from reducing her prices in other states once the distiller
had posted her prices in New York unless the New York Liquor
Authority approved the price reduction. Justice Marshall wrote
that the law effectively "forc[ed] a merchant to seek regulatory ap-
proval in one state before undertaking a transaction in another '"4"
and held the law unconstitutional as a direct regulation of com-
merce.45 Applying Brown to the paradigm case, a reviewing court
would have to hold the district court's issuance of a multistate in-
junction unconstitutional: by applying the California law beyond
California's borders, the district court allowed California to regu-
40 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
" See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1851).
42 See Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, -, 106 S.Ct.
2080, 2084 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
476 U.S. 573, 106 S.Ct. 2080 (1986).
" Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at -- , 106 S.Ct. at 2086.
4. Id., 476 U.S. at -- , 106 S.Ct. at 2087.
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late commerce outside its borders. California, by virtue of the
court's order, could proscribe loss-leading schemes in Nevada, for
example. The Court's opinion in Edgar v. MITE"6 illustrates how
the court's order in the paradigm case might offend the second
commerce clause principle mentioned above, the idea that inciden-
tal regulations violate the commerce clause if excessive in light of
local interests. In Mite, the Court held that the Illinois Business
Takeover Act 47 violated the commerce clause. The Illinois statute
required any person attempting to take over a "target" corporation
to notify the Secretary of State of Illinois and to file certain pa-
pers. The statute defined a target company as any corporation with
ten percent of its shares held by Illinois residents or any company
that met two of the following three criteria: (1) had its principle
place of business in Illinois, (2) was organized under Illinois law, or
(3) had at least ten percent of its capital in Illinois. 48 Because of
this broad definition of a target company, the statute applied to a
wide range of takeover offers, including those made by out-of-state
offerors to out-of-state offerees. For example, in Mite itself, as Jus-
tice White noted, only 27 percent of the target company's share-
holders resided in Illinois,49 yet the statute's broad terms allowed
regulation. Justice White also pointed out that the principal office
and capital requirements of the Illinois statute effectively allowed
Illinois to regulate transactions where not one shareholder resided
in Illinois.5 0
The Court held that even if the Illinois statute only regulated
interstate commerce indirectly, it still violated the commerce
clause because "the Act imposes a substantial burden on interstate
commerce which outweighs its putative local benefits." 51Under
MITE, then, the district court's order in the paradigm case would
offend the commerce clause even if the reviewing court found that
the California law, as applied by the court, did not directly regu-
late interstate commerce. The multistate injunction in the para-
digm case imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce -
it prohibits the national department store from selling one of its
products in any state. Further, California's interest in the issuance
46 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
'7 Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 121/2, 137.51-137.70 (1981), repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, 1983
Ill.Laws 3094.
" Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 121/, 1 137.52-10 (1981).
'9 457 U.S. at 642 (plurality opinion).
50 Id.
" 457 U.S. at 646. The court specifically ruled that the state had no interest in protect-
ing out-of-state shareholders. Id. at 644.
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of the injunction does not outweigh this burden because (1) Cali-
fornia's interest in protecting its consumers cannot extend beyond
the state's boundaries and (2) California does not have a legitimate
interest in regulating non-resident companies' business outside of
California. It is important to keep in mind here that the California
loss-leading statute is not unconstitutional if applied solely within
California's borders. Only the court's application of the statute to
impose an injunction reaching beyond the state's boundaries of-
fends the commerce clause.2
One lower court opinion, discussed briefly earlier in this com-
ment,53 recognized that otherwise valid state unfair competition
laws can offend the commerce clause if applied beyond the state's
borders. In Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, the district court
believed that the Illinois anti-dilution statute could be applied val-
idly within the state of Illinois, but could not be the basis for an
injunction constraining business activity outside the state, except
in the case of advertisements reasonably expected to reach Illi-
nois.5 4 However, because the Seventh Circuit had remanded to the
district court for the entering of a nationwide injunction,55 the dis-
trict court was compelled to issue the injunction.
The district court in Hyatt felt that the issuance of a nation-
wide injunction pursuant to the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act would
violate the commerce clause for many of the same reasons that the
laws in Brown-Forman and MITE did. First, the court stated that
the injunction appeared to be a direct interference with interstate
commerce because it enjoined the defendant's activity in states
where that activity was perfectly legal.5 Second, the district court
believed that even if the statute only indirectly regulated inter-
state commerce, it still violated the commerce clause because the
local interest asserted-protection of a corporation's trademark in
Illinois-did not outweigh the extreme burden placed on interstate
11 For a related discussion, see Justice White's treatment of blue sky laws in MITE, 457
U.S. at 641-2. He cites the several Supreme Court opinions holding that state laws regulat-
ing tender offers within a state are constitutional. If the Illinois statute had functioned as a
blue sky law by regulating only intrastate transactions, it would not have violated the com-
merce clause. However, the Court found that "[t]he Illinois Act differs substantially from
state blue-sky laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take place across state
lines, even if wholly outside Illinois." The extraterritorial effect of the law made it unconsti-
tutional in application.
" See notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 385.
" 736 F.2d. at 1160.
56 610 F.Supp. at 383-84.
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commerce. 57
The district court in Hyatt is, notably, the only court that has
thoroughly addressed the commerce clause problems that arise in
these nationwide injunction cases. As the Hyatt court recognized,
multistate injunctions issued under state law directly regulate in-
terstate commerce if the injunction proscribes purely out-of-state
commerce. These injunctions are particularly objectionable when
they are issued pursuant to an anomalous state law that forbids
practices that other states accept or even encourage. Moreover,
even if one were to dispute that these injunctions are direct regula-
tions of interstate commerce, it seems apparent that the local in-
terest (basically, an interest that is only a state property right)
does not justify infringing upon commerce in numerous other
states.
B. Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Concerns
The due process and full faith and credit clauses also limit the
extent to which federal courts may apply the unfair competition
laws of an individual state beyond the state's boundaries. These
limitations are important when the courts apply the laws of a sin-
gle state to restrain conduct occurring partly or entirely within
other states where such conduct is either permitted or encouraged.
In order to apply the law of the forum state to such out-of-state
activity, the court must undertake a choice of laws analysis.
The Supreme Court has recently said that the due process
clause and the full faith and credit clause impose identical restric-
tions on the Court's choice of law analysis and therefore need not
be considered separately. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,58 the plu-
rality described the test to be applied under either clause:
[The] Court has traditionally examined the contacts of the
State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the
occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. . . . In
order to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair ... the Court has invalidated the
choice of law of a State which has had no significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.59
'1 Id. at 384.
58 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
59 Id. at 308 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added and citations omitted). See also id. at
308 n.10 and 332 (Powell dissenting); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19
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Under this test, before a state can constitutionally apply its law to
a controversy, it must have a significant interest in the controversy
and there must be significant contacts with the state. In addition,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the due process and full
faith and credit clauses require courts to consider the expectations
of the parties and decide whether application of the state law to
the dispute would surprise the parties so much that it would be
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair eA recent Supreme Court deci-
sion illustrating this test provides an excellent analogy to the un-
fair competition problem. The Supreme Court in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts6' held that a court violates the full faith and
credit and due process clauses by applying a single state's laws to a
class action when a significant number of the claims and claimants
have no contact with the state. In Shutts, 28,000 plaintiffs brought
a class action in a Kansas state court against Phillips Petroleum
Company to recover interest on their suspended oil and gas royal-
ties. The plaintiffs were residents of all fifty states and of several
foreign countries. Most of the oil and gas wells in question were in
Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana, with fewer than 5 percent in
Kansas. Phillips was incorporated in Delaware with its principal
place of business in Oklahoma. In spite of Kansas' minimal associ-
ation with most of the- claims involved in the action, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied Kansas law because "the law of the forum
should be applied unless compelling reasons exist for applying a
different law."'6 2 Reversing this decision, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the application of Kansas law violated the
due process and full faith and credit clauses:
Kansas must have a "significant contact or significant aggre-
gation of contacts" to the claims asserted by each member of
the plaintiff class, contacts "creating state interests," in order
to ensure that the choice of Kansas law is not arbitrary or
unfair . . . .Given Kansas' lack of "interest" in claims unre-
(1985) (one test applied for both clauses). Over the years, there has been disagreement with
the Court's use of a single test. In his concurring opinion in Allstate, Justice Stevens im-
plied that a state's choice of law may violate one clause without violating the other, since
they address different concerns. 449 U.S. at 320. This comment will analyze the constitu-
tional concerns under the traditional test. For a recent discussion of the effect that should
be given to the full faith and credit clause, see Arthur R. Miller and David Crump, Jurisdic-
tion and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
96 Yale L.J. 1 (1986).
11 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
61 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
" Shutt v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 221, 679 P.2d 1159, 1181 (1984).
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lated to that State, and the substantive conflict with jurisdic-
tions such as Texas, we conclude that application of Kansas
law to every claim in this case is sufficiently arbitrary and un-
fair as to exceed constitutional limits.6 3
Like the lower court in Shutts applying Kansas law to claims
unrelated to the state, courts issuing nationwide injunctions pursu-
ant to state unfair competition claims frequently bar transactions
largely unrelated to the interests of the forum state. The lack of
"significant contact or aggregation of contacts" with enjoined
transactions in other states casts doubt on many unfair competi-
tion decisions that apply forum law to multistate actions. Much
depends on the particular facts of the case, such as the residence of
the parties, the purpose of the law, and the place where the tort
occurred. For example, the paradigm involving the nationwide ap-
plication of the California loss-leader statute is a dispute between
two parties who are not residents of California. California would
find it nearly impossible to justify the application of its own law in
the other forty-nine states, given that neither business is a resi-
dent, and given that California has no legitimate interest in pro-
tecting non-resident consumers. 4
The case is closer if the plaintiff were a California resident. A
resident plaintiff could argue that all the damage it suffers nation-
wide comes to rest at its principal place of business, in this case
California. California, of course, has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting resident businesses.
Even the legitimacy of this interest will depend on other fac-
tors. If the statute had been enacted to protect consumers rather
than local businesses, the mere fact that the plaintiff was a busi-
ness resident would not constitute an interest sufficient to satisfy
the due process or full faith and credit clauses. Thus, perhaps a
state unfair competition law designed to protect consumers could
never be applied beyond a state's borders because the state would
never have a legitimate interest in protecting non-resident
consumers.
Most state unfair competition laws, however, are not designed
to further consumer interests. The laws considered in this com-
ment - anti-dilution statutes, mold statutes, and New York com-
mon law - tend to favor established businesses at the expense of
"' Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-22 (citation omitted).
See id. at 822 (noting "Kansas' lack of 'interest' in claims unrelated to that State");
MITE, 457 U.S. at 644 (no interest for commerce clause purposes).
1987] 1425
The University of Chicago Law Review
would-be competitors.6 5 Because the purpose of these statutes is to
protect established businesses, a resident plaintiff has a stronger
argument that the application of forum law to activity outside of
the forum furthers this state interest and is therefore constitu-
tional. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of a state's interest in the ex-
tra-territorial application of its unfair competition laws is not ex-
plored in published opinions.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to analyzing the state's in-
terest in these cases, courts must consider the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties to the lawsuit before concluding that the issu-
ance of multistate injunctions pursuant to a single state's unfair
competition law does not violate the full faith and credit or due
process clauses. Accompanying the issuance of broad multistate in-
junctions, there is a strong element of unfair surprise. The Califor-
nia loss-leader paradigm provides an example. In a case involving
two non-resident parties, the court could not reasonably conclude
that either side expected that an anomalous California law would
govern the defendant on a national scale. When the property right
at stake is locally created and neither party is locally based, an
element of unfair surprise will likely always exist. This is especially
true where most other states do not even recognize such a property
interest, as is the case with the California loss-leader statute and
with the anti-dilution and mold statutes.
Even if the plaintiff business were a resident of California,
there would still be an element of unfair surprise when a court is-
sued a nationwide injunction pursuant to state law. It is one thing
to be enjoined only in California; that may be a risk that the de-
fendant accepts when competing with California businesses. How-
ever, the defendant can hardly foresee a nationwide injunction
based solely on California's anomalous state law. As mentioned
above, the state may nevertheless have a strong interest that out-
weighs this fairness concern.
There can be no definitive answer as to whether or not multi-
state injunctions in unfair competition cases violate the full faith
and credit and due process clauses. These cases exhibit endless dif-
ficult variations in the number and residency of the parties, the
number and location of the tort(s), the purposes of the state law,
15 See, e.g., Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Cinnabar 2000 Haircutters, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 191, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)("The aim of [New York's anti-dilution statute] ... was not to 'remedy...
public confusion caused by similar products,' but rather to remedy 'a cancer-like growth of
dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established
distinctive trade-mark or name.' ").
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and the legitimacy of the state interest. Shutts, however, estab-
lishes that neither state nor federal courts can automatically apply
forum law in multistate unfair competition cases. Courts in these
cases must be more mindful of constitutional restrictions when
choosing to apply forum law.
III. IMPRACTICALITY OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
IN UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES
The serious constitutional defects inherent in giving extra-ter-
ritorial effect to state unfair competition laws might be solved, at
least in theory, by more restrictive injunctions that satisfy the
commerce, full faith and credit, and due process clauses. This sec-
tion argues, however, that federal courts will find it extremely diffi-
cult to limit injunctions when finding for a plaintiff on a pendent
state unfair competition claim.
A. Impracticality of Issuing Limited Injunctions that Satisfy the
Commerce Clause
By limiting the scope of an injunction to the state under
whose unfair competition law it was issued, a court would be less
likely to violate the commerce clause. Statewide injunctions would
protect the local interest while avoiding direct regulation of inter-
state commerce. While statewide injunctions might still burden in-
terstate commerce, such regulation would be incidental at most.
Unlike the situation in MITE,66 moreover, the local interests
in unfair competition cases would likely justify any incidental bur-
den on interstate commerce. In MITE, the appellant argued that
the statute was enacted in part to protect shareholders and in part
to regulate the internal affairs of Illinois corporations. However,
since so few shareholders actually resided in the state, the Court
found that there was an insufficient local interest to justify the
statute. Similarly, the Court felt that the state could have no ad-
ministrative interest in regulating transactions between out-of-
state offerors and out-of-state offerees. In contrast with the extra-
territorial application of the Illinois law in MITE, statewide unfair
competition injunctions serve truly local interests. These injunc-
tions would protect any local property rights and would place less
66 457 U.S. at 643-46. In Brown-Forman, the Court did not consider whether the New
York liquor law violated the second tier of its analysis, since it had already determined that
the statute directly regulated interstate commerce. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at -- , 106
S.Ct. at 2086.
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of a burden on interstate commerce than the law challenged in
MITE. These injunctions, therefore, would not offend the com-
merce clause in most unfair competition cases.
However, while single state remedies would usually satisfy the
commerce clause, they are a burdensome alternative to the nation-
wide injunction. Such a procedure might force a plaintiff to bring
suits in all fifty states in an attempt to vindicate his common law
rights in all jurisdictions. This is especially true when the right in
question cannot be neatly characterized as "anomalous" and
clearly actionable only under the law of a single state, for example,
New York.17 Thus, a state-by-state system, while a constitutional
alternative to the nationwide injunction, would be extremely bur-
densome on both the courts and the parties who would have to
engage in such litigation.
B. Impracticality of a Constitutionally Sound Choice of Laws
Analysis
One might argue that courts can avoid the full faith and credit
and due process problems noted earlier if courts only applied state
unfair competition laws beyond the state boundaries if the Shutts
significant contacts standard were satisfied and if application of
the state law would not unreasonably surprise the parties. At first
glance, this solution seems straightforward. Courts are not sensi-
tive enough to the constitutional dimensions of their choice of law
decisions, and, therefore, a more careful examination of constitu-
tional constraints on choice of law would result in much less objec-
tionable unfair competition decisions.
For example, a return to the strict territorialist approach, the
principle that the law to be applied is the law of the state where
the tort occurred,68 would certainly result in a constitutional, albeit
awkward regime. If an activity occurring in all fifty states was ad-
judicated on a state-by-state basis with no state law being given
extra-territorial effect, then none of the full faith and credit and
due process concerns would be raised.
Such an imaginary regime would be a iightmare to adminis-
67 For example, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.
1987), the court was faced with the prospect of trying to decide whether a particular state
would recognize a "publicity right" or not. Many states lack any law on the matter and
plaintiff in such a case would literally have to go to almost every state to have his rights
determined.
68 See, e.g., American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 377-390 (1934).
1428 [54:1411
Unfair Competition
ter."9 Applying fifty laws to fifty fact situations would involve the
courts in an enormous task. In addressing the similar difficulties in
adjudicating class actions on a piecemeal basis, Professors Arthur
Miller and David Crump observed:
Beyond the difficult task of correctly determining foreign law,
the nationwide class action may present an even greater prob-
lem because of the sheer burden of organizing and following
fifty or more different bodies of complex substantive princi-
ples.. . . [One] way to appreciate the dimension of the task is
to consider that fifty opinions are more than most appellate
judges write in a year. The fifty-state-plus-foreign-countries
class action may create a comparable workload within the
confines of a single class.7"
Such an approach is not likely to appeal to any modern court. In
any event, very few states still adhere to a per se rule that the
place of the tort determines the law of the case.7 ' The question
arises, then, as to what choice of law principle can effectively ad-
dress the constitutional concerns mentioned above. In order to sat-
isfy the due process and full faith and credit clauses, the choice-of-
law in the multistate unfair competition case must be sensitive to
possible conflict of laws in every relevant jurisdiction. Where such
conflicts exist, the court cannot apply a single state's law without
assessing the state's "contacts or aggregation of contacts" with the
parties before it, and with all of the activities in-state and out-of-
state that the plaintiff is seeking to enjoin. In addition, the reason-
able expectations of the parties must be considered to ensure, that
the choice is neither arbitrary nor unfair. Thus a court must con-
sider the laws and policies of as many as fifty states, and the court
must evaluate a state's interest in regulating all of the proscribed
activities wherever they are to be enjoined. Although many modern
conflicts rules take into account constitutional considerations and
simplify courts' decisions when considering choice of law issues,
these rules would not prove practical in unfair competition cases.
"' The Sixth Circuit, however, has expressed a willingness to try. In Carson, the court
refused to limit the geographical scope of nationwide injunction issued under Michigan's
common law right to publicity. 810 F.2d at 105, 106. However, it explicitly withheld jurisdic-
tion over the case in order to allow the defendant at a later date to argue that its expansion
of business into a state outside Michigan would not violate the internal substantive law of
that state. Therefore, under the Sixth Circuit's analysis, the defendant who wishes to oper-
ate nationwide is forced to argue the law of the other forty-nine states in order to modify
the injunction.
70 Miller and Crump, 96 Yale L.J. at 64 (cited in note 59).
7' American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d §§ 6 and 145 (1971).
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Sections 6 and 145 of the Second Restatement,"2 for example, sug-
gest that courts should apply the law of the state having the "most
significant relationship" to the transactions and the parties in
question. To take another example, the "interest analysis" ap-
proach developed by Professor Brainerd Currie73 examines the un-
derlying policies of the states involved in an effort to determine
when application of ones state's law implicates real policy conflicts.
Robert Leflar's "better law' 74 approach relies on five main consid-
erations: (1) predictability of outcome, (2) maintenance of inter-
state and international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task,
(4) advancement of the forum state's governmental interests, and
(5) application of the better rule of law. Under any of these ap-
proaches, a court attempting to assure a constitutional choice of
law may face an overwhelming task, even if the end result is the
application of one state's law.
What would a proper attempt to apply these conflicts rules
look like in the multistate unfair competition situation? The fol-
lowing paradigm is offered, not to restate the point that applying
ordinary conflicts rules is impractical, but to illustrate the
problems that arise when modern marketing techniques and a
multistate corporation are involved in a typical unfair competition
claim.
McDonald's and its franchises operate and advertise in various
media in all fifty states. Burger King and its franchises also oper-
ate and advertise in all fifty states. Neither is a resident of New
York. Suppose that McDonald's starts to market and advertise a
new sandwich, the "Hamboni," which is identical to Burger King's
enormously popular sandwich, the "Hamcheesie." Burger King
files suit in federal district court in the Southern District of New
York bringing a Lanham Act claim and a common law unfair com-
petition claim. Because Burger King cannot prove a likelihood of
customer confusion, the Lanham Act claim fails. How should the
court approach the choice of law issue regarding the state law
claim?
The federal court must try to apply New York conflicts rules,7 15
but the court must also ensure that application of the New York
72 Id.
" See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U.Chi.L.Rev. 227 (1958).
7' See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267, 282 (1966).
11 See Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (federal courts must apply the forum
state's choice of law rules).
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unfair competition law does not violate the due process or full
faith and credit clauses. Under Shutts, the court will therefore
have to determine whether New York has "significant contacts"
with the dispute between Burger King and McDonald's to justify
the nationwide injunction. The court will also have to guarantee
that McDonald's and Burger King will not be unfairly surprised by
nationwide application of the New York law. Resolution of these
questions will require that the court engage in complicated empiri-
cal analysis.
A look at one of the rare cases where a court was responsive to
the multistate nature of an unfair competition claim reveals the
complexity of an analysis involving just four states and two parties.
In Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corporation,76 the
Third Circuit was confronted with a situation involving the broad-
cast in Philadelphia and New York of an old boxing match without
the boxer's consent. The court noted the complex choice of laws
decision that it needed to make:
We must now look to Pennsylvania law with regard to the al-
leged injuries in Pennsylvania and, under the Pennsylvania
conflict of laws rule, to the laws of Delaware and New Jersey
as to the Pennsylvania telecasts and to the law of New York
as to the New York telecasts, to determine what damage, if
any, Ettore suffered in each of these jurisdictions. Moreover,
since the NBC New York telecasts penetrated New Jersey, we
must look also to the law of New Jersey through the double
lens of Pennsylvania and New York conflict of laws rules to
determine Ettore's injuries in New Jersey insofar as [the de-
fendant] is concerned."
Any court rule that is responsive to the constitutional con-
cerns enunciated above thus faces a Herculean task in confronting
a multistate unfair competition case. A constitutionally sound
judgment can eventually be rendered, but adjudication under state
law is clearly impractical and unwieldy.
Fortunately, Congress has already legislated a solution to the
problem of adjudicating multistate unfair competition claims. The
remainder of this comment proposes that courts should reevaluate
the extent to which the Lanham Act preempts state unfair compe-
tition laws.
76 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
7 Id. at 485.
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IV. FEDERAL LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Until recently, there was little reason to argue the extent to
which the Lanham Act preempted state unfair competition law.
Before Erie Railroad v. Tomkins,75 federal law controlled all unfair
competition claims brought in diversity in federal court. Even after
Erie, as a result of the widespread federal law in this area, courts
still resorted to federal precedent. As one court noted:
[T]he states had little occasion to build an independent body
of case law in these areas. For this reason and because of the
multistate nature of the problem, instead of formulating novel
concepts many present day courts after paying homage to,
Erie resort to the well defined federal doctrines.79
However, the recent rise of anti-dilution and mold statutes raises
the question of preemption in earnest. This section will first argue
that the Lanham Act preempts state unfair competition laws. Sec-
ond, it will demonstrate that preemption will not greatly change
the substance of the law because many courts already apply federal
law to multistate claims.
A. Lanham Act Pre-emption
The Supreme Court has delineated several ways to determine
whether a federal enactment preempts state law. Courts should
consider a federal law preemptive if "Congress has explicitly man-
dated the pre-emption of state law, . . . or has adequately indi-
cated an intent to occupy the field of regulation, thereby displacing
all state laws on the same subject." In absence of an express or
implied congressional intent, state law will be preempted only "to
the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." An actual conflict
exists when "'compliance with both state and federal regulations is
a physical impossibility,' . . . or when state law 'stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' "80
" 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of the states
and not federal common law). For discussion of the impact of Erie on unfair competition
litigation, see Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks
and Unfair Competition, 42 Colum.L.Rev. 955 (1942); Jerome Gilson, 1 Trademark Protec-
tion and Practice § 7.01 (1985); James W. Moore, Walter J. Taggart, Allan D. Vestel, and
Jeremy C. Wicker, 1A Moore's Federal Practice 0326 (1985).
" Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F.Supp. 179, 193 (D.Del. 1960), aff'd 313 F.2d
472 (3d Cir. 1963).
80 Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984). See also Louisiana Public Ser-
vice Comm'n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, -- , 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1898 (1986).
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Applying this test in the present context, the first line of in-
quiry is whether Congress expressly or impliedly intended to pre-
empt state unfair competition law when it passed the Lanham Act.
If the answer to this question is no, then one must ask whether
state law "actually conflicts" with federal law and is thus pre-
empted. Each of these points will be considered in turn.
1. Intent of Congress. Nothing in the Lanham Act expressly
states that it was intended to preempt all state regulation of unfair
competition. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "the Act ex-
pressly recognizes the legitimacy of state regulation in some in-
stances."'" However, one can argue that preemption is implicit in
the Lanham Act.
Two important sections of the Lanham Act arguably point to
preemption of state unfair competition law. Section 45 states that
"[tihe intent of this [Act] is to regulate commerce within the con-
trol of Congress. . . . [and] to protect persons engaged in such
commerce from unfair competition.""2 And, § 44(h) states that
"[a]ny person designated in paragraph (b) of this section [foreign
nationals] . . . shall be entitled to effective protection against un-
fair competition, and the remedies provided in this [Act] for in-
fringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appro-
priate in repressing acts of unfair competition."8 3 Although by its
terms § 44(h) only applies to foreigners, § 44(i) states that U.S.
citizens shall have the same benefits as others under § 44,84 which
would include a federal cause of action for unfair competition
under § 44(h).
Section 44(h) thus seems to a good indicator of Congress' in-
tent to codify the broad range of federal regulation of unfair com-
petition that existed before Erie. Other authorities also provide
support for this view. Justice White has noted that "the purpose of
the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law of unfair
competition and trademark protection."8 5 Professor McCarthy re-
marks that:
The drafters and promoters of the 1947 Lanham Act . . .
strongly felt that the Act should create a general federal law
S, Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National
Protection of Trademarks?, 75 Trade-Mark Rptr. 269, 283 (1985) (referring to 15 U.S.C. §
1065).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
83 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (1982).
84 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i) (1982).
" See Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2. (1982) (White
concurring).
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of unfair competition. This was in part a reaction to the 1938
Erie Railroad Supreme Court decision, which, it was felt, had
eliminated the existing body of federal unfair competition
common law.8 6
Many other commentators who have studied the Congressional
hearings and legislative history agree that Congress intended that
federal law alone would regulate trademarks used in interstate
commerce.8 7 As one commentator has pointed out, "[t]he legisla-
tive history of the Lanham Act clearly indicates that uniformity of
trademark law . . . was one of the primary objectives of the Lan-
ham Act."88 To achieve uniformity, federal regulation is almost es-
sential; thus, one can conclude that Congress must have intended
to codify the law of unfair competition and preempt state law.
Opponents of preemption argue that § 43(a) is the most im-
portant enunciation of the Act's scope. That section creates a fed-
eral cause of action for false descriptions or representations of
goods.8 9 Proponents of state unfair competition law argue that
s McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition at 341 (cited in note 19).
See especially Handler, 75 Trade-Mark Rptr. at 285 (cited in note 81); Gilson, 1
Trademark Protection and Practice at § 7.01(2) (cited in note 78) (arguing that Congress
dismantled the patchwork structure of Erie by establishing a nationally uniform law gov-
erning the trademark infringement aspects of unfair competition); Joseph P. Bauer, A Fed-
eral Law of Unfair Competition, 31 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 671, 679-81 (1984) (Congress intended to
create a uniform federal law of unfair competition); Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair
Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act, 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1029,
1029-39 (1957) (Act was intended to avoid the consequences of Erie by creating a private
federal law of unfair competition with respect to the sale of good or services); Julius R.
Lunsford, Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition-The Demise of Erie v. Tompkins?, 40
Trade-Mark Rptr. 169, 179 (1950) (commentators interpret the Lanham Act to mean that
the Erie doctrine no longer applies to unfair competition); Charles Bunn, The National Law
of Unfair Competition, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 987, 998-1001 (1949) (either the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act or the Lanham Act preempts state law in cases involving interstate commerce);
Daphne Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 170-186 (1947) (the Lanham Act, its legisla-
tive history, and our international conventions make it evident that the Act reestablished a
federal code of unfair competition, independent of registration under the Act).
88 Handler, 75 Trade-Mark Rptr. at 285 (cited in note 81). To support his reasoning,
Handler cites to a Senate committee report that stated:
[T]rade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate commerce are prop-
erly the subject of Federal regulation. It would seem as if national legislation along
national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce definite
rights should be enacted and should be enacted now.
See Sen.Rep.No. 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-
min.News 1274, 1277 (1946).
89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982):
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false description of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
1434 [54:1411
Unfair Competition
Congress by creating a federal cause of action in this narrow cir-
cumstance indicated its intention to leave state law intact in the
rest of the unfair competition field.
Two different statutory arguments, therefore, suggest different
views about the scope of the federal law of unfair competition.
Most courts ruling on this issue have held that § 44(h) does not
establish federal unfair competition law of broad scope.90 These
courts emphasize that § 44(h) appears at the end of a section deal-
ing entirely with the rights of foreign nationals. Although they ad-
mit that § 44(i) expressly incorporates American citizens into §
44(h)'s provisions, they express doubt that Congress would indi-
cate its intention to create a broad federal law of unfair competi-
tion in such an oblique way.
The courts' reasoning here seems strange in light of the stat-
ute's clear provisions. The reasoning also seems to ignore the
stated purpose of the Lanham Act. Thus, there is little to justify
those courts who have ruled against Lanham Act preemption of
state law on the basis of congressional intent. However, even if the
courts were correct and one could not evince from Congress a clear
intent to preempt state law on this issue, certaiply one can find
that state law should be preempted under the "actual conflicts"
portion of the preemption doctrine.
2. "Actual Conflicts" Analysis. Although it is arguable
whether Congress specifically intended to preempt state law in the
area of unfair competition, certainly there is a strong argument in
favor of preemption because state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." One district court has ruled that the Lanham Act
preempts state law for this very reason.
In United States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine Inc.,9e the
district court struck down the Iowa anti-dilution statute because it
conflicted with the Lanham Act's objective of providing uniformity
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation
of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported
or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall
be liable to a civil action by any person . . . likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
1* See Royal Lace Paper Works v. Pest-Guard Products, 240 F.2d 814, 816-820 (5th Cir.
1957); Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmer's Educational & Coop., 247 F.2d 809, 819 (8th Cir.
1957); American Auto. Assn' v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771, 774-5 (2d Cir. 1953). But see discus-
sion of former Ninth Circuit approach in Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d
788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1981).
, 661 F.Supp. 1360, i365-68 (N.D.Iowa 1987).
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in the area of unfair competition law.9 2 The court stated that:
In providing greater rights to holders of trademarks than are
available to them under the Lanham Act, [the Iowa statute]
and various other state dilution statutes frustrate "the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress" . . . by supplanting the uniform and definite rights
contained in the Lanham Act, which are intended for those
who trade in interstate commerce, with a checkerboard of dif-
fering rights.. . . The Iowa statute would conflict with one of
the major goals of the Lanham Act - uniformity - if it were
applied to goods in interstate commerce. Thus, to the extent
that [the anti-dilution statute] regulates interstate commerce,
it is preempted by the Lanham Act.''93
In addition to the uniformity concerns mentioned in Jaycees,
state anti-dilution statutes and unfair competition laws frustrate
other ends of the Lanham Act. A vehement objection to the Act at
the time of its drafting was that it granted monopolistic rights to
trademark owners."4 To limit the scope of this monopoly, the Act
was drafted to protect trademark rights only if there was a likeli-
hood of confusion as to the origin of the product. Thus, a business
can enforce its rights only by showing that enforcement of those
rights protects consumers. State anti-dilution statutes, however,
provide for protection even in the absence of confusion, as does
New York common law, which provides protection from mere
copying. Any state unfair competition law which grants monopolis-
tic trademark rights without a confusion rationale actively frus-
trates the goals of the Lanham Act. The Act strikes a delicate bal-
ance in order to further the public interest, and any state law
which upsets this balance should be preempted.
B. Federal Common Law of Unfair Competition
One sees from the preceding discussion that there are strong
arguments for preemption. Many, however, still oppose the idea
that the Lanham Act preempts state unfair competition law. These
92 See note 87 and accompanying text. Such a holding was perhaps inevitable given the
increasing reach of federal power under the Lanham Act, the desirability of a nationally
uniform trademark law, and the extent to which state anti-dilution statutes enlarge trade-
mark rights. See Gilson, 1 Trademark Protection and Practice at § 8.01(3) (cited in note 78).
92 U.S. Jaycees, 661 F.Supp. at 1367-68. See also Handler, 75 Trade-Mark Rptr. at 285-
87 (cited in note 81) (noting that "the piecemeal approach to trademark regulation" created
by the anti-dilution statutes is inconsistent with the Lanham Act's purposes).
91 See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition at 140 (cited in note 19).
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people argue that regulation of unfair competition traditionally has
been left to the states and that usurpation of state regulatory
power would merely add more confusion to an already muddy area
of the law. This section of the comment examines the degree to
which federal law currently regulates unfair competition, at least
outside the Second Circuit. To the extent that federal law already
governs unfair competition claims and to the extent that courts ac-
cepting Lanham Act preemption would continue to apply the same
federal unfair competition principles as they have in the past, pre-
emption of state law by the Lanham Act would not work a radical
change in substantive law. The primary effect of preemption would
be to eliminate the troublesome constitutional problems that arise
when federal courts apply state law to multistate disputes. Re-
course to preemption analysis would also increase judicial honesty
since courts would be more open about the present practice of ap-
plying federal precedent to unfair competition claims.
1. Reliance on Long-Standing Federal Precedent. Before Erie,
"a vast body of federal precedents had established a rather effec-
tive set of rules against unfair business conduct."9 5 After Erie,
those decisions technically lost their precedential value. However,
because state law was so underdeveloped, federal courts often re-
sorted to their own precedent anyway. This practice continues to-
day: the courts routinely decide unfair competition cases based on
prior federal decisions. Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Pro-
ductions is a good example.9 7 In trying to decide whether a claim
of "reverse confusion"98s was actionable at common law, the court
followed another federal district court decision, which in turn was
based solely on federal precedent. The Capital Films court recog-
nized that Texas law controlled, but because no applicable prece-
dent could be found, the court felt the only homage it needed to
, Derenberg, 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 1030 (cited in note 87).
96 See, e.g., Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, 628 F.2d 387, 393-94 (5th
Cir. 1980); Bass Buster, Inc. v. Gapen Mfg. Co., Inc., 420 F.Supp. 144, 156 (W.D.Mo. 1976).
See also Note, Effect of Erie v. Tompkins on Unfair Competition Actions in Federal Courts,
16 J.B.A.Kan. 225, 228 (1947).
97 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980).
"' Reverse confusion describes a situation where customers misperceive the junior user
of a trademark to be the original and authentic source of the goods. The senior user is then
perceived to be the infringer when in fact it is the one suffering from the infringement.
Since such confusion may actually benefit the senior user, there is a split of authority as to
whether it is actionable. Compare Westward Coach Manufacturing Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
388 F.2d 627, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1968) (reverse confusion not actionable under Indiana law),
with Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (10th Cir.
1977) (reverse confusion actionable under Colorado law).
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pay the state was to ensure that its finding was not actively repug-
nant to Texas state law.99 As Capital Films demonstrates, federal
decisions have continued to hold sway in the absence of strong
state precedent, although no court has been willing to hold out-
right that federal common law governs most unfair competition
claims. 00
Even when a federal court does examine state law, the result is
usually a finding that because the state does not have "a well de-
veloped body of trademark caselaw, fundamental trademark prin-
ciples will be applied to the common law claims."''1 These "funda-
mental principles" pervade the adjudication of unfair competition
claims. Only the Second Circuit follows state law on a regular
basis. 02
Strictly speaking, it might be a misnomer to label a decision
an application of federal common law when the court declares that
it is only using federal precedent to fill a gap in state law. Nomi-
nally, the court is applying state law, but substantively it is using
either a restatement of pre-Erie federal law or a logical develop-
ment therefrom uninfluenced by any state court or legislature.
These cases are not examples of courts openly preferring a federal
law which conflicts with state law. Rather, they are examples of
how federal precedent and principles continue to thrive.
2. Reliance on Official Trade Board Decisions. Federal com-
mon law in the field of trademark and product configuration rights
also derives from the decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (TTAB) and cases appealed therefrom to the Federal Cir-
cuit and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
The Board's primary function is to determine whether trademarks
are registrable and to conduct opposition and cancellation proceed-
ings by which interested parties can dispute the claims of appli-
99 628 F.2d at 393-94.
100 For examples of judicial reticence in admitting the application of federal common
law, see W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985); Capital Films, 628
F.2d at 394 n.4, Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980). All of
these courts recognized that state law might apply, but they nevertheless employed federal
precedent either because the parties did not argue state law, because no state precedent was
on point, or because state and federal law were similar.
10! Bass Buster, 420 F.Supp. at 156.
102 However, even some Second Circuit panels will resort to a silent application of fed-
eral common law. See, e.g., Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1003-5
(2d Cir. 1983); C.L.A.S.S. Promotions v. D.S. Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1985).
Both opinions cite federal precedent almost exclusively and give no indication that they are
applying state law.
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cants and registrants' 03 The Board will grant registration to users
of inherently distinctive marks or users of descriptive marks which
have become distinctive through commerce-that is, weak marks
that have acquired secondary meaning. 104 Registration will not be
granted if a likelihood of confusion exists between the mark in
question and any other mark previously used in commerce.10 5
In making determinations regarding such issues as confusion
and functionality, the Board and courts deciding appeals there-
from have generated a considerable body of case law directly appli-
cable to the adjudication of typical unfair competition claims. 06 As
a result, other courts frequently cite Federal Circuit and TTAB
opinions when looking for guidance on these issues. °0
3. Reliance on § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The greatest
source of federal common interpretive law has been § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.108 As mentioned earlier, the courts early on refused
to recognize § 44(h) and § 44(i) as establishing a federal law of
unfair competition. Later courts wishing to establish federal com-
mon law in this field had to rely on § 43(a), the provision creating
a federal cause of action for false descriptions or representations of
goods. Although this provision was originally construed quite nar-
rowly, its scope has been expanded to cover many areas of unfair
competition. 09 None of the cases extending the literal wording of §
43(a) admit to the creation of federal common law, yet many
courts have relied on this section to promulgate broad principles of
unfair competition law. 0 Regardless of the courts' hesitance to de-
clare outright that federal law applies to multistate unfair competi-
103 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1063-64 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
105 Id.
101 See, e.g., In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (deciding a functionality
standard); In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 U.S.P.Q. 483 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (likelihood of
confusion standard).
"I See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Products Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3,
427 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986); W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339-40, 342, 345 (7th
Cir. 1985); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 427-8 (5th Cir. 1984).
... 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). For partial text, see note 89.
109 For a history of judicial interpretation of § 43(a), see Bauer, 31 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. at
681-695 (cited in note 87); Gilson, 1 Trademark Protection and Practice at § 7.02 (cited in
note 78).
110 Many commentators have hoped that the expansion of § 43(a) will eventually result
in a comprehensive law of unfair competition. See Bauer, 31 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 671, 672 (cited
in note 87); Derenberg, 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1029, 1031-32 (1957) (cited in note 87). Judges have
also encouraged such growth. See Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538,
546 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark concurring) (declaring that "broad and liberal construction" of
"this remedial legislation [§ 43(a)]" is proper; "[i]ndeed, there is indication here and else-
where that the bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory provision.")
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tion claims, judges have developed a substantial body of case law
that remains the major source of precedent used by the courts
today.
Conclusion
This comment has outlined several problems caused by the
adjudication of multistate unfair competition claims under state
law. Lanham Act preemption of extra-territorial applications of
state law provides the simplest, most practical solution. It would
alleviate constitutional concerns and simplify difficult choice of law
decisions. Judges are faced with important constitutional questions
when they decide what law to apply to a multistate unfair competi-
tion claim. Rather than facing the difficult task of sorting contacts
and policies under the application of state law, courts should be
able to look to the Lanham Act and decide the case under federal
law. Because courts are already applying federal principles in mul-
tistate unfair competition actions, Lanham Act preemption would
cause no great departure from the status quo. However, even if the
preemption argument is ultimately rejected, future unfair competi-
tion decisions must be adjudicated in a different manner if they
are to be responsive to the commerce, due process, and full faith
and credit clauses.
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